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O P I N I O N 
   
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 
 Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary of the United States 
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”), has 
appealed from the District Court’s judgment holding the 
Secretary’s Medicare regulation to be arbitrary and 
capricious, as well as a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause.  The dispute centers around certain Medicare 
reimbursement adjustments to appellees, two Pennsylvania 
hospitals.  The District Court found there was no rational 
basis to exclude from such reimbursements patients covered 
by Pennsylvania’s General Assistance (“GA”) plan, while at 
the same time including patients covered under a federal 
statutory waiver program.  For the reasons that follow, we 
will reverse the judgment of the District Court. 
 
I. Background 
A. Medicare and Medicaid 
Medicare, the federal health insurance program for 
older and disabled individuals, reimburses hospitals for 
specified inpatient services based upon a “prospective 
system.”  42 U.S.C. § 1395ww.  Under this system, payments 
are predicated upon prevailing rates for given services, rather 
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than retrospectively based on a hospital’s actual costs.  Id. at 
§ 1395ww(d).  The statute provides for certain adjustments to 
prospective reimbursement rates, such as for different wage 
levels, hospitals with medical education, and sole community 
hospitals.  Id. at §§ 1395ww(d)(3)-(d)(5).     
 
Another adjustment provided for by the statute is for 
“disproportionate share hospitals” (“DSH”), hospitals that 
serve high numbers of low-income patients.  Whether a 
hospital is eligible for a Medicare DSH adjustment depends in 
part on the number of days during which the hospital treats 
certain low-income patients, also known as “patient days.”  
The relevant language of the subsection concerning 
calculation of Medicare DSH adjustments is as follows: 
 
(II) . . . the number of the 
hospital’s patient days for such 
period which consist of patients 
who (for such days) were eligible 
for medical assistance under a 
State plan approved under 
subchapter XIX of this chapter 
[Medicaid] . . .  
 
In determining under subclause 
(II) the number of the hospital’s 
patient days for such period which 
consist of patients who (for such 
days) were eligible for medical 
assistance under a State plan 
approved under subchapter XIX 
of this chapter, the Secretary may, 
to the extent and for the period the 
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Secretary determines appropriate, 
include patient days of patients 
not so eligible but who are 
regarded as such because they 
receive benefits under a 
demonstration project approved 
under subchapter XI of this 
chapter. 
 
42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5)(F)(vi)(II) (emphasis added).  In 
plain English, the Medicare DSH formula takes into account 
the number of patient days for those patients eligible for 
Medicaid, and may also include patient days for those 
patients ineligible for Medicaid, but who received benefits 
under a Medicaid “demonstration project.” 
 
 Pursuant to the Medicaid Act, individual states submit 
a medical assistance plan which provides coverage to certain 
classes of indigent individuals, which we will call a “State 
Plan.”  42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a).  A State Plan must conform to 
certain statutory eligibility requirements, but the law also 
provides states flexibility regarding some of the categories of 
individuals to be covered, and the medical care and services 
that they can receive.  Id.; see Cooper Univ. Hosp. v. 
Sebelius, 686 F. Supp. 2d 483, 486 (D.N.J. 2009) aff’d, 636 
F.3d 44 (3d Cir. 2010).  Once a plan is approved by the 
Secretary, the state can receive certain reimbursements from 
the federal government based on amounts expended as 
medical assistance under the State Plan, that is, those amounts 
expended covering individuals eligible for Medicaid.  See 
Univ. of Wash. Med. Ctr. v. Sebelius, 634 F.3d 1029, 1031 
(9th Cir. 2011). 
 
6 
 
   As noted above in the Medicare DSH provision cited, 
the Secretary is empowered to waive statutory requirements 
pertaining to federal entitlement programs such as Medicaid 
and “regard” patients as eligible for Medicaid if they are 
treated under an  experimental, pilot or demonstration project 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1315.  Thus, Medicare DSH adjustments 
take into account both the patient days that a hospital has 
treated patients eligible for Medicaid, and days for those 
patients ineligible for Medicaid but who receive benefits 
pursuant to a Medicaid demonstration project.  To authorize 
such a project, known as a Section 1115 waiver project,1 the 
Secretary must conclude that the state-submitted proposal “is 
likely to assist in promoting the objectives of” Medicaid.  
42 U.S.C. § 1315(a).  In addition, the Secretary has discretion 
to choose which Medicaid requirements will be waived, how 
long the waiver lasts, and whether the costs of the project will 
be considered Medicaid-covered expenditures.  Id. at §§ 
1315(a)(1)-(a)(2).  The Secretary must also conclude that the 
project will be budget-neutral.  Id. at § 1315(e)(6).  Waivers 
are not inherently provided for in State Plans; rather, states 
must submit specific applications for Section 1115 waiver 
projects. 
 
B. Evolution of the Medicare DSH Formula 
Initially, for purposes of calculating DSH adjustments, 
the Medicare statute counted simply the “number of the 
hospital’s patient days of service for which patients were 
eligible for Medicaid but not entitled to Medicare Part A . . . 
.”  42 C.F.R. § 412.106(b)(4).  Patients were considered 
                                              
1 This name originated because such waiver authority was 
promulgated in § 1115 in Title XI of the Social Security Act.   
7 
 
eligible for Medicaid if they were eligible for inpatient 
hospital services under an approved State Medicaid Plan.  
“Although the Secretary administers DSH payments, it is a 
fiscal intermediary, typically a health insurance company 
authorized to act on the Secretary’s behalf, who reviews the 
hospital’s end-of-year cost reports.”  Phoenix Mem’l Hosp. v. 
Sebelius, 622 F.3d 1219, 1223 (9th Cir. 2010).  The Medicare 
DSH formula was regarded by intermediaries, at least in some 
states, as including days covered under state GA and charity 
care programs.  In brief, GA programs generally provide 
reimbursement to hospitals for care of individuals who are 
low-income as defined by a given state, but not eligible for 
Medicaid.  Id.  It seems that through the 1990s, intermediaries 
in Pennsylvania included GA patient days in the Medicare 
DSH formula.  (Appellees’ Br. at 7.) 
 
However, “[i]n light of . . . discrepancies between the 
practices of fiscal intermediaries in the various states,” in 
December 1999 the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (“CMS”) clarified that the Medicare DSH formula 
only permitted the inclusion of patient days wherein the 
patients were eligible for Medicaid, excluding state general 
assistance and charity plan patient days going forward.  See 
Adventist Health Sys./Sunbelt, Inc. v. Sebelius, 715 F.3d 157, 
161 (6th Cir. 2013); (App. 568-73).  In January 2000, the 
Secretary issued a Final Interim Rule, stating that: “hospitals 
may include all days attributable to populations eligible for 
Title XIX matching payments through a waiver approved 
under section 1115 of the Social Security Act.”  42 C.F.R. 
§ 412.106(b)(4)(ii).  Thus, while GA patient days remained 
excluded, hospitals could now count patient days for 
individuals covered under a Section 1115 waiver project 
toward their Medicare DSH adjustment.   
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During the subsequent notice and comment period, 
several comments were submitted to the Secretary claiming 
that the inclusion of days under a Section 1115 waiver was 
unfair to those hospitals that did not operate under such a 
waiver, but rather treated patients eligible only under state 
GA plans.  The Secretary agreed that while the regulation 
“does advantage States that have a section 1115 expansion 
waiver in place, these days are considered to be Title XIX 
days by Medicaid standards.”  Medicare Program; Changes to 
the Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems and 
Fiscal Year 2001 Rates, 65 FR 47054-01, 47087, Aug. 1, 
2000.  The Secretary went further:  
 
General assistance days are days 
for patients covered under a State-
only or county-only general 
assistance program, whether or 
not any payment is available for 
health care services under the 
program. Charity care days are 
those days that are utilized by 
patients who cannot afford to pay 
and whose care is not covered or 
paid by any health insurance 
program. While we recognize that 
these days may be included in the 
calculation of a State’s Medicaid 
DSH payments, these patients are 
not Medicaid-eligible under the 
State plan and are not considered 
Title XIX beneficiaries. 
Therefore, Pennsylvania, and 
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other States that have erroneously 
included these days in the 
Medicare disproportionate share 
adjustment calculation in the past, 
will be precluded from including 
such days in the future. 
 
(App. 65-66.)  As such, the Final Rule, issued in August 
2000, stated that Section 1115 waiver patient days could be 
included in Medicare DSH calculations, while GA patient 
days remained excluded. 
 
 Subsequently, Congress passed the Deficit Reduction 
Act of 2005 (“DRA”).  That law amended the statutory 
Medicare DSH provision to state explicitly that patient days 
would be counted for those patients eligible for Medicaid, and 
“the Secretary may . . . include patient days of patients not so 
eligible but who are regarded as such because they receive 
benefits under a demonstration project approved under 
subchapter XI of this chapter [Medicaid].”  42 U.S.C. § 
1395ww(d)(5)(F)(vi)(II).  In addition, the DRA “ratified, 
effective as of the date of their respective promulgations,” 
certain regulations which “provide for the treatment of 
individuals eligible for medical assistance under a 
demonstration project . . . .”  Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 5002(b).  
Specifically listed as one of the ratified regulations was the 
January 2000 Interim Final Rule, which stated that Section 
1115 waiver patient days were to be included in Medicare 
DSH calculations.  Id. 
 
C. State General Assistance Plan 
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After the promulgation of the Final Rule, but before 
the enactment of the DRA, appellees Nazareth Hospital and 
St. Agnes Medical Center, both Pennsylvania hospitals, 
included GA patient days in their 2002 Medicare cost reports 
“under protest.”  (Appellees’ Br. at 11); (App. 121.)  Notably, 
Pennsylvania has not applied for a Section 1115 waiver, and 
instead provides reimbursements to certain hospitals as a 
component of the state GA program.  That GA program 
reimburses hospitals and provides cash assistance for patients 
who are ineligible for Medicaid, but are nonetheless classified 
as low-income or otherwise needy by the state.  (App. 121.)  
Appellees note that, while ostensibly state-run, the GA 
program was described in Pennsylvania’s State Medicaid 
Plan, specifically in amendment SPA 94-08, as a part of the 
state’s proposal to distribute certain lump-sum payments, 
known as Medicaid DSH payments.  42 U.S.C. § 1396r-4.   
 
Such payments, which are distinguished from 
Medicare DSH adjustments that are the subject of this appeal, 
can be distributed at the state’s discretion, so long as they are 
distributed to institutions that provide care to “low-income” 
individuals, as defined by the state itself.  Univ. of Wash. 
Med. Ctr., 634 F.3d at 1035 (describing the different payment 
mechanisms).  States often describe in their state Medicaid 
plan relevant state charity or general assistance plans, so that 
hospitals which treat patients under such plans can receive 
Medicaid DSH payments.  See Adena Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. 
Leavitt, 527 F.3d 176, 179 (D.C. Cir. 2008).2 
                                              
2 A helpful way of contrasting these DSH provisions is that 
both Medicare and Medicaid reimburse hospitals, or adjust 
rates of reimbursement, for the treatment of low-income 
individuals.  Medicare DSH adjustments use Medicaid-
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Accordingly, Pennsylvania amended its state Medicaid 
plan via amendment SPA 94-08 to provide:  
 
additional payments to meet the 
needs of those facilities which 
serve a large number of Medicaid 
and medical assistance eligible, 
low income patients. . . .  These 
payments are available to 
hospitals on behalf of certain low-
income persons who are described 
below and are made in addition 
to, and not as a substitute for, 
disproportionate share payments 
described in other portions of this 
state plan.  
 
(App. 595.)  Amendment SPA 94-08 further stated that those 
“low-income persons” were those who were covered under 
the state GA program.  (App. 595.)  As such, SPA 94-08 
                                                                                                     
eligibility and Section 1115 waiver projects as a proxy for 
determining low-income status.  By contrast, Medicaid DSH 
payments use eligibility either under Medicaid and under the 
state’s definition of low income, to determine economic 
status.  Univ. of Wash. Med. Ctr., 634 F.3d at 1036 (noting 
that the “Medicaid DSH proxy considers either those patients 
who are [eligible for Medicaid] or who qualify under the 
statute’s definition of ‘low income’”); 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-
4(b)(3) (defining “low-income utilization rate” under 
Medicaid DSH in part as including state charity care 
patients). 
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established that Medicaid DSH payments were to be used by 
Pennsylvania, in part, to reimburse hospitals for care of GA 
patients.   
 
D. Procedural History 
Following appellees’ “protest” inclusion of GA patient 
days on their 2002 Medicare cost reports, the Intermediary 
excluded those days from the hospitals’ Medicare DSH 
calculations.  That decision was affirmed by both the 
appellate Provider Reimbursement Review Board and the 
CMS Administrator.  The hospitals appealed the ruling of the 
Administrator to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania, on the grounds that (1) excluding 
GA days was an impermissible construction of the Medicare 
statute by the Secretary, (2) excluding GA patient days while 
including Section 1115 waiver days was arbitrary and 
capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act, and (3) 
such disparate treatment constituted an Equal Protection 
violation. 
 
The case was initially held in suspense pending the 
appeal in Cooper University Hospital v. Sebelius, 686 F.Supp. 
2d 483 (D.N.J. 2009).  That case concerned whether patient 
days covered under the New Jersey Charity Care Program 
should be included in Medicare DSH calculations.  Id. at 484.  
The district court held that while the statute was ambiguous, 
the Secretary permissibly construed the law to exclude charity 
care patient days from the Medicare DSH formula.  Id. at 498.  
We agreed with this reasoning and affirmed in a precedential 
opinion, “substantially for the reasons set forth” by the 
district court, noting that “[w]e could not do it better . . . .” 
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Cooper Univ. Hosp. v. Sebelius, 636 F.3d 44, 45 (3d Cir. 
2010). 
 
Following that ruling, the parties in this case filed 
cross-motions for summary judgment in the District Court, 
with the appellees limiting their arguments to whether the 
disparate treatment of GA and Section 1115 patient days 
constituted arbitrary and capricious action under the APA, or 
a violation of Equal Protection.  The District Court initially 
remanded the case to the agency to make a more complete 
record regarding the distinction between GA patient days and 
Section 1115 days.  The agency responded at length, 
answering inquiries posed by the District Court, such as that 
regarding the similarity between hospital patient populations 
covered under the GA plan and those in other states covered 
under Section 1115 demonstration projects.  In one relevant 
passage, the Secretary noted:  
 
The eligibility criteria for the 
individual State section 1115 
populations are federally 
approved and set forth in the 
terms and conditions of the 
section 1115 waiver project.  
Unlike the State general 
assistance program, the section 
1115 waiver has been reviewed 
and approved by the Federal 
government as likely to assist in 
promoting the objectives of 
Medicaid.  No such Federal 
determination has been made with 
respect to a State-only program.  
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In addition, the expenditures 
under the section 1115 waiver 
must be budget neutral.  The 
Medicaid expenditures under the 
waiver cannot exceed the 
expenditures that would have 
otherwise been spent under the 
Medicaid state plan.  The State 
only funded program has no such 
restrictions. 
 
(App. 75-76.)   The Secretary concluded, in essence, that she 
had acted rationally in including patient days for those 
patients eligible for traditional Medicaid, as well as those 
days, “related to the Federally approved and authorized 
section 1115 waiver populations for whom expenditures for 
care is considered to be an approved expenditure under Title 
XIX.”  (App. 83.)  As such, the Secretary held, because 
Pennsylvania GA patients did not fall under either category, it 
was reasonable to exclude them from Medicare DSH 
calculations. 
 
 The District Court disagreed.  It held that there was no 
rational distinction between the state GA program and several 
Section 1115 waiver projects, in terms of eligibility 
requirements and services covered.  The Court further 
determined that, just as in approving a Section 1115 waiver, 
CMS “determined that the objectives of the Medicaid statute 
were promoted by authorizing” SPA 94-08.  (App. 37.)  The 
District Court concluded that the Secretary’s disparate 
treatment could not stand under both the APA and the Equal 
Protection Clause.  As a consequence, the Court ordered the 
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Secretary to remit certain Medicare DSH adjustments to 
plaintiffs, including patient days under the state GA program. 
 
 
 
 
II. Standard of Review 
We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.  “We apply de novo review to a district court’s grant 
of summary judgment in a case brought under the APA, and 
in turn apply the applicable standard of review to the 
underlying agency decision.”  Pennsylvania, Dep’t of Pub. 
Welfare v. Sebelius, 674 F.3d 139, 146 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(internal quotations omitted).  Pursuant to the APA, courts 
must set aside agency action which is “arbitrary, capricious, 
an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law,” or which is conducted, “without observance of 
procedure required by law . . . .”  5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) & (D). 
 
  “Under what we have called this ‘narrow’ standard of 
review, we insist that an agency ‘examine the relevant data 
and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action.’”  
F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 513 
(2009) (quoting   Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n. of United States, 
Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 
(1983)).  “Agency action is arbitrary and capricious if the 
agency offers insufficient reasons for treating similar 
situations differently.  If [an] agency makes an exception in 
one case, then it must either make an exception in a similar 
case or point to a relevant distinction between the two cases.” 
Muwekma Ohlone Tribe v. Salazar, 708 F.3d 209, 216 (D.C. 
Cir. 2013) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
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Review of an equal protection claim in the context of 
agency action is similar to that under the APA.  That is, an 
agency’s decision must be upheld if under the Equal 
Protection Clause, it can show a “rational basis” for its 
decision.  F.C.C. v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 
(1993).  As such, “the equal protection argument can be 
folded into the APA argument, since no suspect class is 
involved and the only question is whether the . . . treatment of 
[appellees] was rational (i.e., not arbitrary and capricious).”  
Ursack Inc. v. Sierra Interagency Black Bear Grp., 639 F.3d 
949, 955 (9th Cir. 2011).   Taken together, we need only 
consider whether the Secretary set forth a satisfactory, 
rational explanation for her actions here.  See New Jersey 
Hosp. Ass’n v. Waldman, 73 F.3d 509, 517 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(finding that arbitrary and capricious review also governed by 
whether state can show rational basis). 
 
  III. Discussion 
 
Our review of the record establishes that the Secretary 
set forth multiple rational bases upon which to distinguish 
patient days covered under Pennsylvania’s GA program, from 
days covered under a Section 1115 waiver project.  We first 
explain that the Secretary has the statutory authority to treat 
those two categories of patient days differently from each 
other.  Further, we conclude that, given the different purposes 
of the programs, and the extent of federal control over them, 
it was neither arbitrary nor capricious to do so. 
 
A. Statutory Distinction 
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Appellees did not claim below, and do not now 
contend, that the Secretary lacked statutory authority to either 
include Section 1115 patient days, or exclude state GA days 
from Medicare DSH calculations.  While the language of the 
relevant statutory provision obviously does not determine 
whether the Secretary acted in an arbitrary and capricious 
manner, we think it a relevant starting point in our analysis, as 
the statute is at the root of the distinction between the two 
types of patient days at issue. 
 
The statutory subsection, 42 U.S.C. § 
1395ww(d)(5)(F)(vi)(II), mandates that Medicare DSH 
adjustments are keyed to the number of Medicaid-eligible 
patient days, adding that the Secretary may also choose to 
include days for patients eligible under a Section 1115 
project.  Appellees point out that the latter subsection, 
providing discretion to include Section 1115 patient days, was 
passed as part of the DRA in 2005, whereas the regulation at 
issue was finalized in 2000.  Therefore, appellees claim, the 
statute must be evaluated as it stood in 2000, lacking any 
mention of Section 1115 waiver projects. 
 
We note, however, that the DRA explicitly “ratified, 
effective as of the date of” its promulgation, the January 2000 
Interim Final Rule, as it pertained to Section 1115 waiver 
projects.  Pub. L. No. 109-171 §§ 5002(b)(1), (b)(3)(A), (B).  
“It follows that there is no problem of retroactivity.  The 
Deficit Reduction Act did not retroactively alter settled law; it 
simply clarified an ambiguity in the existing legislation.”  
Cookeville Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Leavitt, 531 F.3d 844, 849 
(D.C. Cir. 2008).  Accordingly, there can be no dispute that, 
at the very least, the Secretary had discretion to include 
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Section 1115 patient days in the Medicare DSH adjustment, 
as of the date of the Interim Final Rule in January 2000. 
 
In addition, circuit courts have held that it is a 
permissible, or even necessary, construction of the statute to 
exclude state charity or GA plan patient days from Medicare 
DSH calculations.   In Adena Regional Medical Center v. 
Leavitt, 527 F.3d 176 (D.C. Cir. 2008), the D.C. Circuit held 
that Ohio’s charity care patient days could not be included in 
the Medicare DSH calculation, on the view that the Medicare 
statute specifically excluded such patient days.  Similarly, in 
University of Washington Medical Center, 634 F.3d 1029, the 
Ninth Circuit found that the statute required the Secretary to 
exclude from Medicare DSH calculations days for those 
patients who were not eligible for Medicaid but nonetheless 
covered under Washington’s state plan.  See also Phoenix 
Mem’l Hosp. v. Sebelius, 622 F.3d at 1227 (finding that 
exclusion from Medicare DSH formula of patient populations 
not covered by Arizona’s Section 1115 waiver was “not 
contrary to law, arbitrary or capricious, or unsupported by 
substantial evidence”). 
 
In Cooper, we affirmed that it was permissible for the 
Secretary to exclude New Jersey charity plan3 patient days 
                                              
3 Appellees note that certain of these cases dealt with charity 
care patient days, as opposed to those covered under a general 
assistance plan such as that in place in Pennsylvania.  We find 
that this is a distinction without a difference, as the Secretary 
made clear both in the December 1999 clarification and in the 
Final Rule in August 2000 that both charity care and general 
assistance patient days would be excluded from Medicare 
DSH calculations.  (App. 65-66, 572.) 
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from Medicare DSH adjustments.  The district court correctly 
noted that the DRA “suggest[ed] Congress’ intent to narrowly 
apply the Medicaid proxy fraction,” in ratifying the 
discretionary inclusion only of Section 1115 waiver patient 
days.  Cooper, 686 F. Supp. 2d at 494.4   
In sum, the Secretary had discretion to include Section 
1115 patient days in Medicare DSH adjustments, pursuant to 
congressional ratification, and could exclude state charity or 
general assistance days.  The Government must now establish 
that, in taking both such actions, the Secretary articulated a 
rational basis for doing so.  
 
B. Distinction in Purpose 
The Government argues that the very purpose of a 
Section 1115 waiver project rationally distinguishes it from 
Pennsylvania’s GA plan.  (Gov. Br. at 49.)  That is, a Section 
1115 waiver project is an experimental, demonstration or 
pilot project which is only approved if the Secretary 
concludes that it “is likely to assist in promoting the 
objectives of” Medicaid.  42 U.S.C. § 1315(a).  As CMS 
explained on remand: 
 
The purpose of these [Section 
1115] demonstrations, which give 
States additional flexibility to 
design and improve their 
programs, is to demonstrate and 
evaluate policy approaches such 
                                              
4 Cooper, Adena, and Phoenix Memorial, each concerned 
reimbursement disputes that pre-dated the enactment of the 
DRA in 2005.  
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as: expanding eligibility to 
individuals who are not otherwise 
Medicaid or CHIP eligible; 
providing services not typically 
covered by Medicaid; using 
innovative service delivery 
systems that improve care, 
increase efficiency, and reduce 
costs. 
 
(App. 55.)  In fact, a Section 1115 waiver project can be 
vacated if a court finds that the Secretary could not have 
rationally found the program likely to advance the objectives 
of Medicaid.  See Newton-Nations v. Betlach, 660 F.3d 370, 
381 (9th Cir. 2011) (vacating Medicaid waiver due to 
insufficient evidence that the Secretary “‘consider[ed] the 
impact of the state’s project on’ the persons the Medicaid Act 
‘was enacted to protect’”) (quoting Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 
1057, 1070 (9th Cir. 1994));  C.K. v. New Jersey Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., 92 F.3d 171, 185 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(reviewing similar waiver project under Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children program).  By contrast, rather than a 
demonstration project, the Pennsylvania GA plan constitutes 
the permanent state medical assistance program, and requires 
no federal judgment that it is likely to assist in promoting the 
goals of Medicaid. 
 
However, the District Court and appellees reject this 
distinction.  The District Court found, and appellees urge 
here, that the Secretary approves a Section 1115 waiver 
project just as she does Pennsylvania’s GA program – 
specifically amendment SPA 94-08 – which is included as 
part of the state Medicaid plan.  This finding was in error.  
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While the Secretary must find that a Section 1115 
waiver project is likely to assist in promoting the objectives 
of Medicaid, she reviewed SPA 94-08 for an entirely different 
reason.  Under the Medicaid DSH statute, state Medicaid 
plans “require[] [DSH] payments to hospitals to take into 
account the situation of hospitals which serve a 
disproportionate number of low income patients with special 
needs.”  42 U.S.C. § 1396r-4(a)(1).  That provision requires a 
state to submit an amendment to its Medicaid plan that 
“specifically defines” eligibility for Medicaid DSH payments, 
and “provides . . . for an appropriate increase in the rate or 
amount of payment for such services provided by such 
hospitals . . . . ”  Id. at § 1396r-4(a)(1)(A)-(B).  In addition, 
states are required to submit a “description of the 
methodology used by the State to identify and to make 
payments to disproportionate share hospitals . . . on the basis 
of the proportion of low-income and [M]edicaid patients . . . . 
” Id. at § 1396r-4(a)(2)(D).   
 
 Thus, the Secretary did not “determine[] that the 
objectives of the Medicaid statute were promoted by 
authorizing” SPA 94-08, as the District Court held.  (App. 
37.)  Rather, the Secretary reviewed SPA 94-08 simply to 
ascertain how Pennsylvania intended to disburse Medicaid 
DSH payments.  See Adena, 527 F.3d at 179 (“Federal law 
obliged Ohio to submit the [amendment to its State Medicaid 
Plan] to the Secretary for approval because the mechanism for 
providing a DSH adjustment under Medicaid is part of Ohio’s 
Medicaid plan, and the Secretary must approve that plan.”).  
A Section 1115 waiver is therefore distinct from SPA 94-08, 
in that it serves a different purpose, and provides the 
Secretary greater control and oversight. 
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Importantly, CMS noted this precise distinction upon 
remand, stating that, “[u]nlike the State general assistance 
program, the section 1115 waiver has been reviewed and 
approved by the Federal government as likely to assist in 
promoting the objectives of Medicaid.  No such Federal 
determination has been made with respect to a State-only 
program.” 5  (App. 75-76); see also (App. 82) (noting that 
Delaware’s Section 1115 waiver project “was required to . . . 
be approved by CMS as consistent with the objectives of 
Medicaid in order to be treated as Medicaid expenditures for 
the costs of individual care.  That process did not occur under 
a section 1115 waiver approval for the general assistance state 
days involved in this case.”).   
 
We agree with the Government that these distinct 
purposes “rationally separate Section 1115 demonstration 
projects from Pennsylvania’s GA program.”  (Gov. Br. at 44.)  
Given this “relevant distinction,” the Secretary was not 
treating “similar situations differently,” by including patient 
days covered under a demonstration, experimental or pilot 
program approved to advance the objectives of Medicaid, but 
excluding patient days under a state program that lacked any 
such purpose.  See Muwekma Ohlone Tribe, 708 F.3d at 216. 
 
                                              
5 It is of no consequence that this reasoning was mapped out 
on remand, rather than during the initial promulgation of the 
Final Rule in 2000.  See Alpharma, Inc. v. Leavitt, 460 F.3d 1, 
6 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“Needless to say, if it is appropriate for a 
court to remand for further explanation, it is incumbent upon 
the court to consider that explanation when it arrives.”). 
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C. Distinction in Control 
The Government also argues that the degree of federal 
control over Section 1115 waiver projects distinguishes them 
from Pennsylvania’s GA program.  That is, if the Secretary 
determines that an experimental waiver project is likely to 
advance the goals of Medicaid, she has significant authority 
to determine the precise scope of the project.  The Secretary 
may determine which Medicaid requirements will be waived, 
how long the waiver will last,6 and whether the costs of the 
project will be considered Medicaid expenses eligible for 
matching payments under the statute.  42 U.S.C. §§ 
1315(a)(1)-(a)(2); see Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. 
Thompson, 313 F.3d 600, 602 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“The 
Secretary also has authority to ‘regard’ costs for a 
demonstration project as an ‘expenditure’ pursuant to that 
state’s Medicaid plan.”).  
 
The Secretary has no analogous authority to alter the 
scope of a state GA program, even if referenced in the state 
Medicaid plan, as in the case of SPA 94-08.  As noted above, 
the Secretary reviews such amendments for compliance with 
requirements pertaining to Medicaid DSH payments.  42 
U.S.C. §§ 1396r-4(a)(1)(A)-(B). 
 
On remand, CMS also noted this distinction as grounds 
for differentiating Section 1115 waiver programs from 
Pennsylvania’s GA plan.  It noted that, unlike a state general 
assistance program, “[t]he eligibility criteria for the individual 
                                              
6“In general,” CMS noted, “§ 1115 demonstrations are 
approved for a five-year period and can be renewed, typically 
for an additional three years.” (App. 55.) 
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State section 1115 populations are federally approved and set 
forth in the terms and conditions of the section 1115 waiver 
project.”  (App. 75-76); see also (App. 77) (finding that any 
comparison between GA and Section 1115 waiver 
populations “can at best be only speculative,” as Pennsylvania 
had not submitted its GA plan for approval as a Section 1115 
waiver project.)  Again, we find that such a distinction 
establishes a rational basis for the Secretary to treat 
Pennsylvania’s GA patient days differently from days 
covered under a Section 1115 waiver project.   
 
Like the Secretary in promulgating the regulations at 
issue, we recognize that such differentiation may 
disadvantage hospitals such as appellees, that do not operate 
in a state with an ongoing waiver project.  However, this 
occurred because of permissible, rational choices made by the 
Secretary.  She reasonably chose to include in Medicare DSH 
calculations patient days which were covered under a waiver 
program that she had specifically found would advance the 
objectives of Medicaid, and over which she had authority to 
initially shape the project’s scope.  She further determined 
that state general assistance days, which shared none of these 
characteristics, would not be so included.  Such actions were 
neither arbitrary or capricious under the APA, nor a violation 
of equal protection.  Moreover, nothing prevents 
Pennsylvania from filing an application to qualify for a 
Section 1115 waiver. 
 
D. Similarity in Population and Plans 
The District Court focused on appellees’ claim that 
patients and services covered under Section 1115 waiver 
projects are the same as those covered by Pennsylvania’s GA 
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plan.  As the District Court stated, “[n]either the inpatients 
nor the hospital services made available under SPA 94-08 in 
contrast to Section 1115 waiver programs differ significantly 
– except as to the hospital’s statutory path to federal matching 
funds.”  (App. 35.)  It concluded, “[o]n this record, plaintiff 
hospitals in all relevant respects are indistinguishable from 
other hospitals in Section 1115 waiver states.”  (App. 45.)   
 
It is sufficient to state that even if such alleged 
similarities are accurate, they are irrelevant.  While people 
and services may be the same, they can be treated differently 
for purposes of reimbursement if the reason for the differing 
treatment is rational.  The Secretary has described relevant 
distinctions between patient days under the state GA plan and 
those under a Section 1115 waiver project, such that she 
rationally excluded the former from Medicare DSH 
calculations and included the latter. 
 
We reach the same conclusion with regard to the 
District Court’s holding that the Secretary erroneously found 
that Pennsylvania’s GA program was “state-only funded.”  
Appellees argue that because Medicaid DSH payments are 
used to subsidize GA program care, the state plan is federally 
funded, and thus identical to traditional Medicaid payments.  
(Appellees’ Br. at 34.)  They accordingly take issue with 
CMS’s repeated description of the GA program as state-only 
funded.   
 
First, we note Nazareth Hospital’s own stipulation: 
“General Assistance Days represent patient days of 
Pennsylvania Medical Assistance beneficiaries enrolled in the 
‘State-Only funded’ General Assistance Program.” (App. 
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121.)  We will not fault the Administrator for adopting the 
hospital’s agreed-upon terminology.7    
 
Second, we reiterate that whether there is similarity in 
patient populations or funding provided is immaterial, as 
differing treatment between the GA program and Section 
1115 waiver projects need only be justified by a rational basis 
advanced by the agency.  As shown above, (1) the purpose of 
Section 1115 waiver projects and (2) their accompanying 
conditions under federal control, reasonably distinguish such 
projects from Pennsylvania’s GA program, and were set forth 
as rational bases for differing treatment by the Secretary.8   
 
                                              
7 The Government also takes pains to point out that 
Pennsylvania indeed utilizes Medicaid DSH payments to 
subsidize its state GA plan, but that the lump-sum allotment is 
capped by statute and is not providing matching payments for 
any specific patient or services.  We agree that any funding of 
GA services with federal dollars is thus purely a choice of 
Pennsylvania and cannot alone convert the GA plan, a 
creature of state law, into one of federal law.  See Univ. of 
Wash. Med. Cntr. v. Sebelius, 634 F.3d at 1035  (“[T]he 
federal government was not spending its funds for the GAU 
and MI populations’ care. . . .  Regardless of how the State 
chooses to distribute it to DSH hospitals, this money is not 
being paid on behalf of any specific individual for any 
specific service.”). 
8 We accordingly reject appellees’ alternate argument that, in 
describing the GA program as state-only funded, the 
Secretary’s decision was not supported by substantial 
evidence under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E), or was otherwise 
contrary to the record. 
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E. Rulemaking Comments 
 
Appellees alternatively contend that the Secretary’s 
decision should be reversed because she ignored comments 
made in the rulemaking process, pursuant to 5 U.S.C.       § 
553(c).  “The requirement that agency action not be arbitrary 
or capricious includes a requirement that the agency 
adequately explain its result, and respond to ‘relevant’ and 
‘significant’ public comments.  However, neither requirement 
is particularly demanding.”  Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. F.A.A., 988 
F.2d 186, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). 
 
While the District Court did not address this issue, we 
conclude that the Secretary adequately responded to the 
comments posed during the rulemaking process, which 
claimed that patient days under a General Assistance plan 
should be treated identically to Section 1115 waiver days.  
The Secretary noted that “comments from Pennsylvania 
hospitals supported the continued inclusion of general 
assistance days in the Medicaid portion of the Medicare DSH 
adjustment calculation as well as expansion waiver days.” 
(App. 65.)  The Secretary then responded in part:  
 
[w]hile we initially determined 
that States under a Medicaid 
expansion waiver could not 
include those expansion waiver 
days as part of the Medicare DSH 
adjustment calculation, we have 
since consulted extensively with 
Medicaid staff and have 
determined that section 1115 
expansion waiver days are utilized 
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by patients whose care is 
considered to be an approved 
expenditure under Title XIX.  
While this does advantage States 
that have a section 1115 
expansion waiver in place, these 
days are considered to be Title 
XIX days by Medicaid standards.  
 
(Id.)  Together with the rest of the explanation, “this response 
demonstrates that the [agency] considered and rejected” the 
arguments of appellees, “this is all that the Administrative 
Procedure Act requires.” Covad Commc’ns Co. v. F.C.C., 450 
F.3d 528, 550 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (internal quotations and  
brackets omitted) (quoting City of Waukesha v. E.P.A., 320 
F.3d 228, 258 (D.C. Cir. 2003)). 
 
As an aside, it appears that the general remedy for 
failure to adequately respond to rulemaking comments is not 
complete vacatur of an agency rule, but rather remand for 
additional consideration.  See Ass’n of Private Sector Colls. & 
Univs. v. Duncan, 681 F.3d 427, 449 (D.C. Cir. 2012) 
(remanding to agency to “address . . . concerns” raised by 
comments that were “never really answered.”).  Here, the 
District Court initially remanded the case to the agency, 
requesting further explanation of the precise issues raised in 
the comments cited by appellees.  We have found the 
agency’s explanations on remand to be sufficient.  Ignoring 
the record following remand and remanding for a second time 
for failure to address rulemaking comments, some thirteen 
years following the promulgation of the rule, would seem 
unwarranted at best.  See Covad Commc’ns Co., 450 F.3d at 
550 (“The failure to respond to comments is significant only 
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insofar as it demonstrates that the agency’s decision was not 
based on a consideration of the relevant factors.”) (quoting 
Thompson v. Clark, 741 F.2d 401, 409 (D.C.Cir.1984)). 
 
IV.  Conclusion 
The Secretary set forth multiple rational bases 
justifying her including Section 1115 patient days in 
Medicare DSH calculations, but excluding days covered 
under Pennsylvania’s GA plan.  It is well-established that “a 
court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency,” 
and should “uphold a decision . . . if the agency’s path may 
reasonably be discerned . . . .”  F.C.C. v. Fox Television 
Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 513-14 (2009) (quoting Motor 
Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).  Accordingly, the 
challenged regulations must stand.  We reverse the decision 
of the District Court. 
